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By reducing the commitment made by employers, fixed-term contracts can help low-skilled 
youth find a first job. However, the long-term impact of fixed-term contracts on these workers’ 
careers may be negative. Using Spanish social security data, we analysed the impact of a large 
liberalization in the regulation of fixed-term contracts in 1984. Using a cohort regression 
discontinuity design, we find that over the first ten years in the labour market, the reform 
reduced the number of days worked (by 4.5%) and earnings (by 9%). Over 27 years of labour 
market career, yearly earnings losses amount to a persistent 7.5%. 
 
European countries typically have a high level of employment protection legislation (EPL), 
making it expensive to dismiss workers on permanent contracts. While EPL does not 
reduce overall employment, it has an adverse effect on the employment of workers with 
low and hard to observe productivity, such as youth (OECD, 2006). To address this 
problem, a number of European countries have made it easier for firms to use fixed-term 
contracts with lower firing costs. It was hoped that fixed-term contracts would help 
improve the labour market outcomes of low skilled workers in high EPL countries. 
But do fixed-term contracts really help? In theory, fixed-term contracts, by decreasing 
firing costs, can help workers with uncertain credentials obtain employment. Moreover, 
fixed-term contracts may help workers accumulate human capital as well as gain contacts 
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that can allow them to obtain better jobs in the future. On the other hand, there is a danger 
that workers go from fixed-term contract to fixed-term contract, leading to lower 
employment stability and no progression towards better jobs (Blanchard and Landier, 
2002). In theory, the impact of fixed-term contracts on the labour market outcomes of 
affected workers is therefore ambiguous. 
The empirical evidence on the impact of fixed-term contracts and temporary work on the 
labour market outcomes of affected workers is also mixed. A number of papers examine 
the stepping stone hypothesis according to which temporary work helps workers land 
permanent jobs. The evidence at the European level is mixed, with some papers finding 
evidence of the stepping-stone hypothesis (Booth et al., 2002; D’Addio and Rosholm, 
2005; among others) while some other papers find that temporary contracts do not improve 
access to permanent contracts (Zijl, Van Den Berg and Heyma, 2004). The evidence on 
temporary help jobs is also mixed with the best identified study finding a somewhat 
negative impact of temporary work on earnings and employment in the US (Autor and 
Houseman, 2010), while studies using European data find a positive effect of temporary 
help jobs on securing permanent employment (e.g. Ichino et al., 2008). Finally, analyzing 
several employment protection reforms across European countries, the paper by Kahn 
(2010b) finds no effects or slightly negative effects of temporary contracts on employment. 
Even if fixed-term contracts can help workers secure permanent jobs, the long-term 
effects of easily available fixed-term contracts remain uncertain. Indeed, when workers lose 
a permanent job, they may be back on a fixed-term contract and their return to stable 
employment may be delayed. The current literature only addresses the impact of temporary 
work within a few months to a few years of the first temporary job, and the long-run impact 
remains unknown.  
Another limitation of the existing literature is that it compares people who did and did not 
use temporary contracts (or temporary help agencies) within a given regulatory framework. 
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This research cannot therefore directly inform us about what happens when the regulation 
of temporary work becomes less stringent. With a laxer regulation of fixed term contracts, 
some unemployed workers may get a fixed term contract fairly quickly and then transition 
to a permanent contract. However, it is possible, that, were fixed term contracts not easily 
available, the same workers would have transitioned to a permanent contract even more 
rapidly. Therefore, even if we believe the stepping stone hypothesis that, for an 
unemployed worker, taking a fixed term contract is better than staying unemployed, this 
does not imply that making fixed term contracts more easily available will increase the 
proportion of low skilled workers in permanent contracts and benefit their careers. Overall, 
both the long-term impact of temporary work on careers, and the overall impact of fixed-
term contract regulation remain open questions.  
In this paper, we use Spanish social security data to assess the long-term impact of fixed-
term contract regulation on employment and earnings. Spain is an ideal ground for our 
research because fixed-term contract use was liberalised early and Spain subsequently 
became the OECD country with the highest share of fixed-term contracts (Dolado et al., 
2002). To assess the impact of fixed-term contracts, we track cohorts of workers who enter 
the labour market before and after a 1984 reform that liberalised the use of fixed-term 
contracts. We focus specifically on male high school dropouts, that is, those without a high-
school diploma and hence with less than 11 years of education, because they are most 
likely to be affected by the liberalization of this type of contracts. We assign their age of 
labour market entry to be 16 as this is the minimum legal age to work in Spain and we 
know that those individuals are high school dropouts.  
Thus, using a cohort discontinuity design (see e.g. Borghans et al., 2014), we find 
suggestive evidence that, compared to workers who entered the labour market (turned 16) 
in the trimester just before the reform, workers who enter the labour market (turned 16) in 
the trimester after the reform experience a larger probability of working before age 19. 
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However, workers who enter the labour market after the reform also experience 
significantly lower days of work and lower earnings over their subsequent career. We find 
that these losses are largest in the first ten years of these workers’ careers. Based on the 
first ten years of potential labour market experience, and after controlling for year and 
experience fixed effects, we estimate the loss in terms of days of work to amount to 10.7 
days per year (4.9% of average days worked). The earnings loss is as high as 9.8% per 
year. By comparison, the Great Recession reduced days worked by 7% and wages by 22% 
for young workers in Spain (Garcia-Perez and Vall-Castello, 2015). Therefore, the short to 
medium run effects of temporary contracts are as large as half of the effects of a deep 
recession that raised the Spanish unemployment rate from 8% before 2008 to 27% in 2013. 
Even for workers with more than ten years of potential experience, the reform still has a 
significant, if smaller, negative effect on days worked and earnings. Over 27 years of these 
high school dropouts’ careers, yearly earnings losses due to the liberalization of fixed term 
contracts amount to 7.3%, a large and persistent effect.  
We perform the same analysis for male high school graduates and find no effect of the 
reform on days worked or earnings in the first ten years in the labour market. Using the 
high school graduates as a control group, we can re-estimate the impact of the reform on 
high school dropouts. In this difference-in-differences specification, we find a statistically 
significant negative effect of the reform on days worked and earnings that is of similar 
magnitude to the results based on the cohort discontinuity alone. These difference-in-
differences results alleviate the concern that the estimated impact of the liberalization of 
fixed-term contracts on high school dropouts is biased by other concurrent changes in the 
labour market. 
We also investigate the channels through which the reform negatively affects the careers 
of male high school dropouts. One of the reasons why greater fixed-term contract 
availability at the beginning of a worker’s career has a negative impact on long-run career 
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outcomes is that workers are more likely to work under non-permanent contracts well after 
labour market entrance. These results are consistent with prior literature (Güell and 
Petrongolo, 2007) showing that the rate of upgrading of temporary contracts into 
permanent ones is less than 10% in Spain, so once workers are in a temporary contract, 
they tend to remain in a temporary contract (or non-employed). A key reason for the lack of 
upgrading is that firing costs become higher after a worker accesses a permanent contract. 
Therefore, firms prefer to hire a new worker on a temporary contract after the temporary 
contract expires rather than upgrading the worker to a permanent contract. The persistence 
in temporary contracts further exposes workers to the well-known wage penalties 
associated to both unemployment and temporary work. 
This paper makes two key contributions to the literature. First, while previous literature 
on the labour market impact of fixed term contracts has relied on regression adjustments 
and other non-experimental techniques for identification, we use a cohort discontinuity 
design and a difference-in-differences strategy that exploit a large change in Spanish 
regulation. Second, our paper innovates by examining the long-term impact of fixed-term 
contracts on young people’s career: Social Security data allows us to have more than 20 
years of follow up whereas previous literature examined outcomes over at most a few 
years. While most of the previous literature on European labour markets finds a positive 
short run effect of fixed-term contracts and temporary work, we find a negative impact of 
fixed term contracts on labour market outcomes in the long run. Our results are most 
similar to the quasi-experimental study of temporary help jobs in the US (Autor and 
Houseman, 2010). We conclude that the combination of examining long-run outcomes and 
using a quasi-experimental design allows us to uncover substantial and previously 
undocumented negative effects of lax fixed-term contract regulation on the long-term 
labour market outcomes of low-skilled youth.  
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There have been a number of previous papers examining the use of fixed-term contracts 
in Spain, but focusing on somewhat different issues from our paper.1 First, the previous 
literature has examined the impact of fixed-term contract duration on the probability of 
finding a permanent job. Most of those papers (see for example Güell and Petrongolo 
(2007) or García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2011)) agree that the effect of temporary 
contract duration on the probability of finding a permanent job is slightly increasing with 
tenure at the temporary contract but mainly concentrated at specific durations of the 
temporary contract (6, 12, 24 – the typical duration of these contracts-, and specially at the 
36th. month, the maximum duration of such contracts in Spain). Second, the paper by 
Rebollo (2011) stresses the idea that not only the number of temporary contracts and job 
interruptions are important in determining the chances of a worker to find a permanent 
contract but also the number of firms for which this person has worked is an important 
determinant. Therefore, accumulating temporary contracts with the same firm reduces the 
probability of getting a permanent contract while moving from one firm to another with a 
temporary contract increases the chances of getting a permanent contract. Third, the 
literature has examined the impact of fixed-term contracts on firms’ outcomes. Using the 
simulations of a dynamic labour demand model, Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego 
(2014) evaluate the effects of the same labour market reform we are analyzing: the 
liberalization of fixed term contracts in 1984. They find that both total employment2 and 
job turnover increased due to the reform in Spanish manufacturing firms. Also, Dolado et 
                                               
1 Some recent papers as Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado and Le Barbanchon (2012) or  Costain, Jimeno and Thomas 
(2010) analyse the effect of temporary contracts in Spain within the current context of economic crisis. The 
former explores the extent to which the significantly larger increase in unemployment in Spain, versus 
France, during the ongoing recession can be accounted for by the difference in EPL between the two 
countries. The latter studies the extent to which the coexistence of permanent and temporary jobs accounts for 
the volatility of employment in Spain. An also recent paper by Fernández-Kranz et al. (2015) finds that 
having a permanent contract partially protects Spanish women against the part-time/full-time wage gap. 
2 Examples of other papers analyzing the impact of employment protection legislation on firm outcomes are 
Autor, Kerr and Kugler (2007) for the US, and Cingano et al. (2015) for Italy. 
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al. (2012) finds a relationship between temporary contracts and lower TFP in Spanish 
manufacturing firms.  
Our paper is also related to a literature that examines the long-term labour market impact 
of entering the labour market under high unemployment. Kahn (2010a), Moulton (2011) 
and Oreopoulos et al. (2012) all find negative long-run wage effects of entering the labour 
market under adverse economic conditions. Our work complements this literature by 
examining the long-term impact of policy rather than macroeconomic conditions. Although 
our regression discontinuity model identifies the impact of the policy by comparing two 
cohorts that enter the labour market only one trimester apart, in the robustness test section 
we provide additional evidence that our results are not driven by different labour market 
conditions at entry in these two consecutive trimesters. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss the history of temporary contracts 
in Spain. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the 
results and some discussion and robustness checks are performed in section 5. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
1. History and Current Rules of Temporary Contracts in Spain 
1.1. Historical Background 
During the time of Franco’s regime, the Spanish labour market was heavily regulated with 
a single trade union to which both employers and employees had to belong and with strong 
labour regulations to protect employment. This meant that, in reality, all jobs were full-time 
jobs of a permanent nature. After Franco’s death in 1975 changes were introduced to relax 
some of the previous regulations. The most important one was the legalization of free trade 
unions and the abolishment of the single trade union in 1977.  
It was not until 1980 that the strongest modernization of the labour relations system was 
introduced in Spain with the approval of the Workers’ Statute. This law assumed every 
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contract to be an open-ended contract as a general case, whereas temporary contracts were 
intended to be used only for jobs whose nature was temporary (seasonal jobs, temporary 
substitution of permanent workers, etc). Furthermore, the Worker’s Statute kept most of the 
restrictions on dismissals. Dismissed permanent workers would receive severance 
payments that depend on whether the dismissal is fair or unfair. For fair dismissals, 
severance payments equal to 20 days of salary per year of job tenure with a maximum of 
one year wages, while for unfair dismissals severance payments amount to 45 days with a 
maximum of 42 months of wages. The reasons for the dismissal to be considered as fair are 
twofold: either the firm argues that the employee is incapable of performing his/her tasks or 
it argues that there are economic or technological reasons that require the dismissal of the 
worker. If a worker is dismissed under a fair dismissal by the firm but he/she does not 
agree with the fairness of the process, he/she can sue the firm and a legal process begins in 
which the firm has to pay the legal costs (in any case) as well as the wages of the worker if 
the dismissal is finally judged to be unfair by the court. In reality, labour courts effectively 
ruled most dismissals as unfair and so the costs of the legal process were usually higher for 
the employer than the severance payment for unfair dismissals. Although temporary 
contracts had a much lower severance payment (8 days per year of seniority), the 
restrictions on the use of this type of contracts meant that their use was very limited during 
the first half of the 1980s (Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego, 2014; García-Pérez and 
Muñoz-Bullón, 2011). 
During the first half of the 1980s, the Spanish unemployment rate experienced a rapid 
growth and it went over 20%. This event prompted the Spanish government to introduce a 
new reform in 1984.3 This was the first reform designed to liberalise the use of temporary 
contracts and to reduce dismissal costs for this type of contracts. The most important 
                                               
3 The law was passed in August 2nd 1984 and the full implementation of the law was established in a “Real 
Decreto” in October 1984. 
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element of the reform is the fact that it eliminated the requirement that the activity 
associated with a temporary contract had to be of a temporary nature. Therefore, firms 
whose activities are not of a temporary nature could sign temporary contracts with any type 
of worker after the reform of 1984. These contracts can be signed for a period between a 
minimum of six months and a maximum of three years. After the three years, the contract 
cannot be renewed, and the worker must either be fired (in this case, the employer cannot 
hire any other worker for that job and has to wait for at least one year to hire the same 
worker) or must be offered a permanent contract by his/her current employer. Furthermore, 
another advantage of this type of contracts is that firing costs at termination are very low (8 
days per year of tenure but they can even be zero in some cases) and this termination 
cannot be appealed in front of the courts. The reform in 1984 did not alter any of the 
conditions for permanent contracts explained above (Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego, 
2014), which made temporary contracts even more appealing for firms. 
As a result of this legislative change, the proportion of male employees aged 15-24 under 
temporary contracts increased from less than 40% to over 70% in less than five years after 
the approval of the reform, as can be seen in Figure 1.4 Between 1985 and 1994, over 95% 
of all new hires were employed through temporary contracts and the conversion rate from 
temporary into permanent contracts was only around 10% (Güell and Petrongolo, 2007). 
Thus, the main concern with the liberalization of temporary contracts after 1984 was that it 
generated a huge segmentation in the Spanish labour market between unstable low-paying 
jobs and stable high-paying jobs, without helping to reduce unemployment. 
Shifting direction in light of these concerns, in 1994 new regulations limited the use of 
temporary employment contracts to seasonal jobs. In addition, the 1994 reform slightly 
                                               
4 The rate of temporary employment in the Spanish labour market as a whole moved from less than 10% to 
over 30% in the same period. Data in Figure 1 is taken from the Spanish Labour Force Survey, which only 
reports information on the type of contract (temporary/permanent) from 1987. In the following section, we 
present evidence to show that the use of temporary contracts was very small before the 1984 reform. 
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relaxed dismissal conditions for permanent contracts. In particular, the definition of fair 
dismissals was widened by including additional “economic reasons” for them. In practice, 
however, employers continued to hire workers under temporary contracts for all types of 
jobs and not just for seasonal jobs. This perceived ineffectiveness of the 1994 reform led to 
a new reform in 1997, which was eventually extended in 2001. As with the 1994 reform, 
the goal of the 1997 and 2001 reforms was to reduce the use of temporary contracts. The 
1997 reform created a new type of permanent contract, with lower severance costs in case 
of unfair dismissal (33 days per year of seniority) and with fiscal incentives in the first two 
years of the contract (i.e., reductions of employers’ payroll taxes).5 However, rather than 
trying to limit the use of temporary contracts by further possibly ineffective regulation, 
these new reforms widened the employers’ incentives to hire workers from certain 
population groups under permanent contracts.6 The 2001 reform essentially extended the 
1997 reform by applying lower subsidies to more worker groups than the previous reform 
(García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón, 2011). The consequences of these subsidies, however, 
have not been a reduction in the use of temporary contracts or an increase in workers’ 
employment stability but, on the contrary, only negligible effects on both dimensions 
because of the important side-effects (basically substitution effects) such subsidies have 
entailed (see García-Pérez and Rebollo, 2009). 
 
1.2. Evolution of Temporary Contracts in Spain 
Although the Spanish Labor Force Survey only reports information on the type of contract 
from 1987, some data from a report published in 1988 (Mateos and Sebastián, 1988) show 
                                               
5 This was the first time (in 1997) since the Workers’ Statute in 1980 that severance costs were changed for 
permanent workers in Spain.  
6 In particular, the 1997 reform reduced dismissal costs for unfair dismissals by about 25% and payroll taxes 
between 40% and 90% for newly signed permanent contracts and for conversions of temporary into 
permanent contracts after the second trimester of 1997 for workers under 30 years-old, over 45 years-old, the 
long-term unemployed, women under-represented in their occupations, and disabled workers (see, in this 




that temporary contracts represented a very low percentage of the total number of non-
agricultural private sector employees in 1983 (below 3% until 1986). We can see in Figure 
2 that the number of new temporary contracts increased from the last trimester of 1984 
when the new legislation on temporary contracts was passed.  
On the other hand, the Spanish Labor Force Survey shows that the proportion of 
temporary employees as a percentage of total employment was around 10% at the 
beginning of 1987 and was already around 35% in the mid-1990s. Therefore, very soon 
after the introduction of the 1984 reform, Spain was the country in Europe with the highest 
proportion of temporary contracts and this rate has been approximately three times larger 
than the average in OECD countries and approximately 2.5 times higher than the average in 
Europe until the second half of the 2000s (see Figure 1).   
It has been widely recognised that the group of workers that has been most affected by 
the widespread use of temporary contracts in the Spanish economy is the youngest group of 
workers that enters the labour market. If we look at data from the OECD in Figure 1, we 
can see that the share of temporary contracts for the group of workers aged 15-24 was 
already 37.5% in 1987 (as opposed to 15.6% for the whole population of workers). If we 
restrict this age group even further, the Spanish Labor Force Survey shows that temporary 
contracts represented almost 50% of total employment for the age group 16-19 already by 
1987 (as opposed to 15.6% for the whole population).   
Again, data on temporary contracts before the introduction of the 1984 reform for the 
group of young workers is difficult to find but the same report mentioned above (Mateos 
and Sebastián, 1988) contains data on the number of apprenticeship contracts (which 
represent one part of the group of temporary contracts) from 1981 to 1986 as well as data 
on the percentage of these contracts with respect to the group of employees in the non-
agricultural private sectors aged 16-19. We can see in Figure 3 that the percentage of these 
contracts for the group of individuals aged 16-19 increased from around 2% before 1984 to 
12 
 
15-16% in 1985 and 21% in 1986. Again, this represents only one type of temporary 
contracts (apprenticeship contracts) and for one group of workers (non-agricultural private 
sector workers) but it is quite impressive how the use of these contracts has increased since 
1984. 
Therefore, as our aim in this paper is to disentangle the long-term effects of the 1984 
reform we will use a regression discontinuity strategy comparing high-school dropout men 
who reach the labour market entry age of 16 before and after the reform. As we have seen 
that this group of individuals is the most likely to be affected by the 1984 reform, we will 
compare individuals that entered the labour market when temporary contracts were not 
widely available with individuals that had their first labour market experience when the 
main restrictions for the use of temporary contracts were abolished. Therefore, even if we 
do not have individual information on the type of contract held in the first job, we know 
from previous evidence that just 2% of young workers had a temporary contract before the 
reform while 21% of them had a temporary contract by 1986 and almost 50% by 1987.7 
Our aim is to understand whether entering the labour market under two very different 
labour market situations (with or without widely available temporary contracts) had any 
effect on long-term labour market outcomes.   
 
2. Data and empirical strategy 
2.1. Data  
This study will use the Continuous Sample of Working Lives (“Muestra Continua de Vidas 
Laborales”, MCVL) which is a microeconomic dataset based on administrative records 
provided by the Spanish Social Security Administration. Each wave contains a random 
sample of 4% of all the individuals who had contributed to the social security system 
                                               
7 These figures come from Mateos and Sebastián (1988) and correspond to both male and female workers. 
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(either by working or being on an unemployment scheme) or had received a contributory 
benefit (such as permanent disability, old-age, etc.) during at least one day in the year the 
sample is selected. Hence, the sample is not including those individuals without any contact 
to Social Security in such a year. This may create some risks of sample selection, especially 
among women, immigrants or young workers. Hence, in order to minimise the potential 
selection effects, we combine the database for seven waves, from 2006 to 2012. That is, we 
have everybody that had a relationship of at least one day during this seven year period 
with the Social Security administration. For them, we have their complete labour market 
history observed in the data. In our sample, we select the cohorts born between 1965 and 
1972 so that individuals are aged 34-47 during 2006-2012. Therefore, it is very rare for 
native men at these ages not to have any relationship of at least one day with the Social 
Security administration during a seven year period. This may be a potential problem, 
however, for women or immigrants in the sample as they have a more interrupted and 
discontinuous labour market trajectory. Therefore, we restrict the analysis to the native 
male sample. 
There is information available on the entire employment and pension history of the 
workers, including the exact duration of employment, unemployment and disability or 
retirement pension spells,8 and for each spell, several variables that describe the 
characteristics of the job or the unemployment/pension benefits. There is also some 
information on personal characteristics such as age, gender, nationality and level of 
education.  
Our main sample includes all high-school dropout native males who were born between 
the first trimester of 1965 and the fourth trimester of 1972. We determine their trimester of 
                                               
8 As explained in, for example, Garcia-Perez and Rebollo (2009), there exists a potential issue of 
measurement error in the number of employment and unemployment spells and their duration given that firms 
can offer contracts for very short periods but subsequently recall workers. When this occurs, we treat the 
employment spell as a continuous period, despite the short interruption that appears in between. More 
specifically, we unify successive registers when they correspond to the same worker in the same firm with the 
same type of contract, and when the interruption lasts for less than 15 days. 
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labour market entry to be the trimester they turn 16 as the minimum working age in Spain 
is set at 16 years old and these individuals are high school dropouts. Thus, we can compare 
cohorts who experienced the same labour market conditions, except that some entered the 
labour market in a tightly regulated fixed term contracts regime while others entered the 
labour market in a laxer fixed term contract regime.9,10 It is important to realise that we are 
not comparing a whole career spent under restrictive or lax fixed term contract regulation, 
but two careers, both exposed to lax fixed term contract regulation for most years, but that 
differ in the fixed term contract regulation in the first trimester of the career. As the reform 
was fully implemented by October 1984, individuals born in the third trimester of 1968 are 
used to determine what happens with a tight regulation of fixed-term contracts at entry 
whereas individuals born in the fourth trimester of 1968 (who turn 16 in Oct-Dec 1984) are 
used to assess what happens with a lax regulation of fixed-term contracts as they reach the 
age of labour market entry after the implementation of the reform.  
We have 24.926 native males in the sample of high school dropouts, 14.726 workers 
born between 1962 and 1968 and 10.200 born between 1969 and 1975.11  Descriptive 
statistics of the variables included for our sample can be found in Table 1 and Table 2.  
On top of our main sample of high school dropouts, we also use a sample of 68.544 
native male high school graduates. This sample is used to examine the impact of the reform 
on a group of workers who are more educated and should therefore experience fewer 
                                               
9 The minimum legal age for working in Spain was 14 before 1980 and 16 since that year. However, in 1977 
there was already a regulation that increased the age to 16 years old. As can be seen in Figure 11 in the 
appendix, essentially no one in our oldest cohort born in 1965 was working before age 16, so the working 
patterns anticipated the change in the minimum legal age of working. We drop the few individuals who start 
working before age 16. 
10 As individuals can enter the labour market after the age of 16, we impose an extra sample restriction to 
include only those workers that begin working before age 21 in order to gain in sample homogeneity. 
Therefore, we interpret these results as an “intent-to-treat” estimation. 
11 The wage data is subject to bottom and top coding but the incidence of this in our estimation sample is 
quite low: there is no bottom code due to the possibility of working part-time and the percentage of workers 
in our sample with a wage in the top code is just 3.6%.  
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difficulties in the labour market. For this sample, we retain cohorts born in 1962-1969,12 
and we keep only individuals who start working before age 22. In this sample, the first 
trimester cohort that could be affected by the reform is the cohort born in the first trimester 
of 1966. Indeed, in Spain, the cutoff for entering school is in January. So, those who are 
born in the first trimester of 1966 can graduate from high school in the summer of 1984 at 
the earliest and be affected by the liberalization of fixed-term contracts in the fall of 1984. 
In contrast, those who were born in the last trimester of 1965 can graduate from high 
school in 1983 the earliest, and would not be affected by the reform during their first year 
in the labour market if they graduated on time.  
    We will look at the effect of the reform on several labour market outcomes measured 
over the individual’s labour market career. These outcomes include the number of non-
permanent employment spells, the number of days worked, and the logarithm of the 
earnings. 
 
2.2. Empirical Strategy 
We analyse the effect of the reform on a set of labour-market outcomes measured yearly. 
The key explanatory variable is the trimester of birth cohort, since this determines whether 
individuals enter the labour market before or after the liberalization of fixed-term contracts. 
We define the trimester of birth cutoff as the fourth trimester of 1968: that is, we consider 
as treated the cohort who turns 16 in October-December 1984, and older cohorts as 
untreated by the new policy at labour market entry. Indeed, the law liberalizing fixed term 
contracts was passed in August 1984 but was only fully implement in October 1984. In 
robustness tests (Table 9 and Table 10), we will check the sensitivity of our results to 
dummying out the transition cohorts, i.e. those who turn 16 in the third or fourth trimester 
                                               
12 We have some missing values for wages for cohorts born 1962-1963 because wages were not properly 
measured (or were missing) in this dataset before 1990. 
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of 1984. It has to be noted that the cohorts that we define as untreated are also affected by 
the reform some quarters after entering the labour market. Our argument is that the impact 
of the reform on these cohorts is very small because the sensitivity of labour market 
outcomes to the availability of fixed term contracts is by far the greatest at labour market 
entry. We have several reasons in support of this argument. First, the assumption that 
labour market outcomes are especially affected by conditions at entry is strongly supported 
by prior literature (Kahn, 2010a; Oreopoulos et al., 2012). Second, for the Spanish case, we 
have seen that there is a very large change in the use of fixed-term contracts and 
apprenticeships contracts from the quarter before to the quarter after the introduction of the 
reform (Figure 3). Thus, at the quarterly level there is a discontinuous jump in the 
availability of fixed-term contracts. In fact, the jump is even starker when we exclude 
transition cohorts (see Figure 3, and analysis of outcomes conditional on this exclusion in 
Table 9 and 10). Therefore, we will measure the impact of the reform by looking at jumps 
in the outcome variables for the cutoff cohort (the one that entered the labour market just 
after the reform). 
We expect the impact of the liberalization of fixed-term contracts to be stronger in the 
first ten years in the labour market. Therefore, we first restrict the data to the first ten years 
of potential labour market experience for each cohort (we will also show results with all 
years). We then collapse the individual data at the level of trimester of birth cohort (c) and 
calendar year (t), like in Oreopoulos et al. (2012). We collapse the data by year and not just 
by cohort13 in order to be able to add the following controls: year fixed effects to account 
for macro factors, and potential experience fixed effects. The data is collapsed at the 
calendar year level and not at the trimester level because the outcomes in the data such as 
earnings or days worked are only observed at the calendar year level. 
                                               
13 Our main results are qualitatively similar if we instead use individual data with the same specification, and 
if we use fewer cohorts closer to the cutoff.  
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Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), we run the following baseline specification for the 
cohort discontinuity design (weighing by cell size), which includes a different trend on 
each side of the cutoff point: 
 =  + ℎ  − + ℎ  −  +  +  +  +
.           (1) 
Where the cutoff point C is the cohort born in the fourth trimester of 1968. The model 
includes a linear cohort trend consisting of a birth year cutoff (C) subtracted from the 
cohort’s birth trimester ℎ  −  which estimates the trend14 in the outcome 
variable analysed, for all birth cohorts. This trend is then interacted with the reform 
indicator (this is equal to one for all cohorts born at the cutoff C or later) to allow for 
a change of trend in the post-reform cohorts. is a calendar year fixed effect and  	is a 
years of potential labour market experience fixed effect, and  is the error term. The 
years of potential experience fixed effects control for the number of days worked on 
average by workers with x years of potential experience: so these fixed effects are for one 
year of potential experience, two years of potential experience, etc. These potential 
experience fixed effects vary with time and cohort because different cohorts have different 
years of experience at different points in time. We cluster the standard errors by cohort.  
    The variable that captures the effect of the policy is , an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the individual is born at or after the trimester cutoff, so that  3β  is the shift in 
the intercept of the post-cutoff trend which represents the effect of the treatment. How can 
the coefficient of interest 3β  be interpreted? For example, when log earnings is the 
outcome , 3β  tells us the percentage effect impact of the liberalization of fixed-term 
contracts on annual earnings (on average over the career), and after accounting for macro 
                                               
14 Hence, this variable is named “trend” in the tables of results. We have also estimated the model with 
higher-order polynomials for the cohort trend (Table 9 and Table 10). 
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variables (time effects , ) and labour market experience (). Accounting for years of 
labour market experience is particularly important when earnings are on the left-hand side, 
since experience has a strong impact on earnings in the first years of a workers’ career.  
In order for the effect to be correctly identified, regression discontinuity models require 
that the running variable (in our case the trimester of birth) cannot be manipulated so that 
the probability of being on each side of the discontinuity is exogenous. This is obviously 
satisfied in our sample for the date (trimester) of birth. However, as we also select 
individuals that are high-school dropouts in order to assume that they enter the labour 
market at age 16, it could be the case that the reform affected the probability of individuals 
studying more or less. In this case, we would observe a jump in the number of individuals 
in our sample for the first cohort entering the labour market just after the implementation of 
the reform. We can see in Figure 4 that this is not the case, as the percentage of men of 
each cohort who are high-school dropouts, and therefore are in our sample, declines 
steadily over time. This is a steady decline due to the progressive increase in the amount of 
education for each subsequent cohort and we can observe that there is no discontinuous 
jump for individuals born in the fourth trimester of 1968 (the first trimester cohort affected 
by the reform).  
In Table 3, we also formally test15 for an impact of the reform on the probability of 
dropping out of high school. We restrict the sample to males who are either high school 
dropouts or high school graduates. We use the same cohort regression discontinuity model 
but the outcome variable is now the probability of being a high school dropout. We can see 
in Table 3 that there is no significant impact of the reform on dropping out of high school, 
whether we use a linear (col. 1-2) or quadratic (col. 3-4) trend for birth cohorts. That is, the 
first cohort that entered the labour market after the reform (fourth trimester of 1984) does 
                                               
15 We cannot use the popular McCrary (2008) test because our forcing variable, trimester of birth, is not 
sufficiently close to being continuous. 
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not have a significantly different probability of being a high school dropout than the cohort 
that entered the labour market just before the reform (third trimester of 1984). We thus 
conclude that the reform did not affect high school graduation.  
The key identification assumption for the cohort discontinuity design is that the only 
discontinuous change at the cutoff is the liberalization of fixed-term contracts. In practice, 
the concern is that there may be important changes in the Spanish labour in the fourth 
trimester of 1984 as compared to the third trimester of 1984 (when our treated and control 
cohorts respectively enter the labour market) and that these changes could bias our estimate 
of the impact of the reform. Although it is very unlikely that there is a labour market shock 
that kicks in exactly during the fourth trimester of 1984, to further address this concern we 
use a control group: male high-school graduates. We expect the liberalization of fixed-term 
contracts to have less of an effect on high-school graduates because they tend to be more 
employable than high-school dropouts (Blazquez Cuesta, 2008 ; Dolado et al., 2013), 
among others, document this fact for the Spanish case). We first estimate the impact of the 
reform on male high-school graduates using the same cohort discontinuity design as for the 
high-school dropouts (equation 1), and restricting the data to the first 10 years in the labour 
market. We then use a difference-in-differences specification where the data is collapsed by 
trimester of birth, year, and education (): 
 =  + ℎ  − + ℎ  −  +  +
 +  +  +  + .      (2) 
This specification is similar to the previous specification (1). The cutoff  is now specific 
to an education group: the cohort born in the last trimester of 1968 for high school 
dropouts, and the cohort born in the first trimester of 1966 for high school graduates (for 
high school graduates to enter the labour market in the fall of 1984, they must have 
graduated in the summer of 1984). The post-reform cohort indicator  is also specific 
to an education group. The dummy  is equal to 1 for high school dropouts and 0 
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otherwise. The difference-in-differences estimate is the coefficient  on the interaction 
between the high school dropout dummy and the post-reform cohort dummy. 
 
3. Results 
We are interested in evaluating the long-term impact of entering the labour market under a 
regime where fixed term contracts are easy for firms to use. Specifically, we would like to 
answer the following question: does greater availability of fixed term contracts lead to 
more days of employment and higher accumulated earnings in the long run? 
 
3.1. Number of Non-Permanent Contracts and Labour Market Insertion  
We first investigate whether the reform led to a greater number of fixed-term contracts or 
non-permanent contracts16 using the cohort discontinuity design described by equation (1). 
Because the data on the type of employment contract is low quality before 1990, we use 
years 1990-2012 to assess the impact of the reform on the number of fixed-term and non-
permanent contracts. In Table 4, Panel A, we find that the impact of the reform on the 
number of fixed-term contracts is positive but falls short of statistical significance (P-value 
of 0.14 in col. 2) for high school drop-outs. The impact of the reform on high-school 
graduates is close to 0 and not statistically significant (Panel A, col. 4). When we use the 
difference-in-differences specification (Panel A, col. 5, coefficient on After*Treat), we find 
that high school dropout men who entered the labour market in the fourth trimester of 1984 
had a larger number of fixed-term contracts per year between 1990 and 2012 than men who 
entered the labour market in the third trimester of 1984. This effect is statistically 
significant: entering the labour market under a lax fixed term contract regulation increases 
                                               
16 In order to capture a deeper understanding about instability in labour market careers, we include in this 
measure not only all fixed-term contracts but also all self-employment and special regimes' employment 
spells. The latter deals with employment in agriculture, fisheries, training programmes, etc. The average 
number of non-permanent contracts in our sample is 0.313 per year between 1990 and 2012, that is, about 7 
employment spells in total between 1990 and 2012. 
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the annual number of fixed-term contracts by 0.042 per year, which means 14.6% more 
fixed-term contracts per year.  
When we analyse the impact of the reform not only on fixed-term contracts but on all 
non-permanent contracts, we find stronger results. Thus, we find a positive and significant 
impact of the reform on the number of non-permanent contracts held by male high-school 
dropouts (Table 4, Panel B, col. 2). Again, there is no effect of the reform on the number of 
non-permanent contracts held by high school graduates (Panel B, col. 4). The difference-in-
differences specification (Panel B, col. 5) shows that the reform led to male high-school 
dropouts holding 0.052 (17.7%) more non-permanent contracts per year between 1990 and 
2012.  
The fact that the impact of the reform is larger and more significant on all forms of non-
permanent work suggests that fixed-term contracts beget not only more fixed-term 
contracts but more precarious work (see footnote 15 above for the definition of non-
permanent work). Overall, these results show that men who entered the labour market 
under lax fixed term contracts regulation were more likely to hold non-stable employment 
contracts even years after their entry into the labour market.  
Before examining long-run employment effects, we show the impact of the introduction 
of fixed term contracts on the initial labour market insertion of youth. Specifically, we 
investigate the impact of the reform on the probability of working before age 18 or before 
age 19. Graphically, the results are suggestive of a positive impact of the reform on the 
probability of finding a first job before age 18 (Figure 5) or 19 (Figure 6), especially if we 
exclude the transition cohorts born in the third and fourth trimester of 1968. We then use a 
regression on individual level data, with one observation per individual and using the 
cohort discontinuity design described by equation (1). Regression results (Table 5)17 show 
                                               
17 Regressions also control for trimester of birth because there are important differences in the outcome 
depending on the trimester of birth (seasonality). 
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the policy change had a positive and significant impact on the probability of working 
before age 18 (when we dummy out the transition cohorts in col. 2) or 19 (col. 3 and 4). 
Those low educated native male workers who began working just after the 1984 reform are 
9% (col. 4) more likely to work before age 19. Thus, the reform may have facilitated the 
integration in the labour market for young people. 
 
3.2. Employment and Earnings 
We now look at employment outcomes over the long-run. Since we expect the results to be 
concentrated in the first 10 years in the labour market, we first show graphs for outcomes in 
the first ten years of potential experience (Figure 7 and Figure 8). Employment and 
earnings trends were positive prior to the reform, with each cohort doing better than the 
previous cohort. In the trimester of the reform however, we see a large downward jump. 
Furthermore, the trend in both employment and wages becomes negative after the reform, 
with each cohort doing worse than the previous one. This negative post-reform trend may 
be due to the reform itself, given that the use of fixed-term contracts continued to grow 
after the reform (see Figure 2 and Figure 1).  Thus, male high-school dropouts who entered 
the labour market under a lax fixed-term contract regime had lower employment and 
earnings during the first ten years of their careers. 
Regressions in Table 6 confirm the negative impact of the reform on employment. 
Without controls, the reform is found to have decreased annual days of employment by 12 
days. After controlling for macro factors (year effects) and potential labour market 
experience, the reform still has a negative and highly significant effect on yearly days 
worked: it reduces yearly days worked by 10.7 days (4.9% of average yearly days worked 
in the first 10 years of potential experience by the pre-reform cohort born in the third 
trimester of 1968). The negative coefficient on After*Trend also confirms preliminary 
evidence in Figure 7: the trend in the number of days worked among high school dropouts 
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was significantly more negative after the reform. For high school graduates, the impact of 
the reform on days worked is small and statistically insignificant (col. 3 and 4). The trend is 
also not significantly changing after the reform. In the difference-in-differences 
specification (2), where high school graduates serve as a control for high school dropouts, 
we find that the reform decreased the annual days worked by high-school dropouts by 17 
days (col. 5). The fact that the difference-in-differences estimate is of the same order of 
magnitude as the estimates based on the cohort discontinuity alone is supportive of the 
assumption that our estimate of the impact of the reform is not driven by other changes in 
the labour market around the time of the reform.  
Finally, we investigate the very long-run effects of the reform. In Table 6, column 6, we 
use all the years in our data and find that the reform decreased the yearly number of days 
worked by 7 days (2.6% of average yearly days worked up to 2012 by the pre-reform 
cohort born in the third trimester of 1968). This effect corresponds to a total of 189 days of 
employment lost over 27 years by male high-school who entered the labour market under a 
lax fixed-term contract regulation. This negative employment effect is likely due to the fact 
that, as shown above, under a lax fixed term contract regulation, more non-permanent 
contracts are used, which likely leads to workers losing employment more often.  
Apart from employment we also look at yearly earnings during the first ten years of 
potential labour market experience. Regressions in Table 7 show that men who entered the 
labour market under a laxer regulation of fixed term contracts accumulated lower 
earnings.18 The yearly earning loss is estimated to be 9.8% when we include year and 
experience fixed effects (second column of Table 7). As already shown in Figure 8, we are 
also finding that the trend in accumulated earnings is more negative after the reform. Can 
                                               
18 Among individuals with a fixed-term contracts some differences in wage growth patterns can also exist as 
there are diferent types of fixed-term contracts with diferent durations. In this line, the paper by Amuedo-
Dorantes and Serrano-Padial (2007) shows that job-stayers with fixed-term contracts are more able to narrow 
their wage gap with respect to workers with permanent contracts (than job-movers with fixed-term contracts). 
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this earnings loss be explained by the lower days of employment accumulated by the cohort 
entering the labour market during a lax fixed-term contract regulation (cohort born in the 
fourth trimester of 1968)? If we estimate the effect of the reform in percentage points, we 
get that the reform made affected workers to spend 4.9% fewer days in employment. Given 
the estimated wage gap of 9.8%, we can see that about half of the large earnings loss 
experienced by the cohort entering the labour market just after the reform could be 
explained by the fewer days of work accumulated by this cohort. The rest of the wage gap 
might be connected to the well-known wage gap between permanent and temporary 
workers observed in Spain since the beginning of the nineties (See Jimeno and Toharia, 
1993) due to the wage penalties associated with job interruptions. In fact, the paper by 
García Pérez and Rebollo (2005) documents important wage losses (of about 11%) due to 
involuntary job interruptions for Spanish workers.  
Theoretically, the model by Blanchard and Landier, (2002) can account for our empirical 
estimates of the impact of the introduction of temporary contracts on work and wages. In 
their model, workers are first hired in a low productivity entry-level job. The productivity 
of all workers in entry-level jobs is the same, and workers are paid low wages, due to the 
low productivity of entry-level jobs. Eventually, entry-level workers reveal their 
productivity (technically, a new productivity is drawn from a distribution). This new 
productivity level is different for each worker: therefore, the entry-level job serves as a 
screening device. Workers who do not become productive enough are fired at some cost 
and replaced with a new entry-level hire, and workers who are productive enough are 
promoted to permanent jobs with higher productivity and higher wage.  
The introduction of fixed-term contracts lowers the cost of firing workers in entry-level 
jobs while leaving the (higher) firing costs in permanent jobs unchanged. By lowering 
firing costs in entry-level jobs, the reform lowers the bargaining power of workers in entry-
level jobs and hence increases profits that firms can make for entry-level jobs. A firm 
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wants to promote a worker to a permanent contract if the worker’s productivity level in a 
permanent job is high enough to compensate for the higher bargaining power. Since the 
introduction of fixed-term contracts increases the gap in bargaining power between workers 
on fixed-term contracts and workers on permanent contracts, it becomes relatively more 
profitable for firms to have workers on fixed-term contracts. Therefore, firms demand a 
higher level of productivity before they are willing to promote a worker to a permanent 
contract. This explains why fixed-term contracts decrease the promotion rate from entry-
level jobs to permanent jobs.   
Overall, with fixed-term contracts, firms are more willing to hire workers in entry-level 
jobs, but also less willing to promote them to permanent jobs. The first prediction is 
consistent with our finding that workers are more likely to be employed by age 18 or 19. 
The second prediction can explain the loss of wages in the longer run, since lowering the 
promotion to higher productivity jobs lowers wages.  
Next, we return to our empirical work and explore the impact of the reform on high-
school graduates and find that the liberalization of fixed term contracts had no significant 
effect on log earnings (Table 7, col. 4) after controlling for year and experience fixed 
effects. The difference-in-differences estimate implies that the reform decreased the 
earnings of high school dropouts by 12% (col. 5), an estimate that is similar to our baseline 
estimate in col. 2. Finally, the very long term impact of the liberalization of fixed-term 
contracts on earnings is found to be negative and significant with a 7.3% yearly earning 
loss (col. 6) over 27 years. 
We have investigated the impact of the liberalization of fixed term contracts on 
employment and earnings by comparing the birth cohort that enters in the trimester before 
the reform with the birth cohort that enters in the trimester right after. However, as noted 
before based on the graphical analysis, each post-reform cohort was doing worse than the 
previous one in terms of days of work and earnings. Regressions confirm that the effect of 
26 
 
the reform on the trend is significant and negative for both days of employment and 
earnings (see the coefficient on After*Trend in col. 2 in Table 6 and Table 7). The post 
reform-trend is negative (adding the coefficient on Trend and After*Trend). This evidence 
is thus consistent with the impact of the reform being more negative for younger cohorts 
entering the labour market after the reform, as the use of fixed-term contracts was ramping 
up. 
Finally, we explore the timing of the impact of the liberalization of fixed-term contracts, 
to test our assumption that the impact of the reform is concentrated in the early years in the 
labour market. In Table 8, we estimate the impact of the reform separately for different 
levels of potential labour market experience: 0 to 9 years, 10 to 19 years, and more than 20 
years. We find that the impact on both days worked and earnings is largest in the first ten 
years of labour market experience. When we further disaggregate years of experience 
within the first ten years (col. 3 and 4), we find that the largest negative effects are 
concentrated in the first three years, with persistent negative effects thereafter. These 
results are consistent with the finding in Booth et al. (2002) that the wage penalty for 
holding a temporary contract is concentrated in the first three years of labour market 
experience. Beyond the first ten years, the impact of the reform on yearly days worked is 
about 50% as large but still negative and significant for years of experience 10-19 and over 
20 (col. 1). For earnings, the impact of the reform is more persistent: the negative impact of 
the reform is about 70% as large for years of experience 10-19 and over 20 (col.2). The 
liberalization of fixed term contracts had a negative impact on days worked and earnings in 
the first ten years of potential experience, and this negative effect was persistent if smaller 






4. Discussion and robustness checks 
4.1. Discussion 
Our results differ from some of the findings in prior literature. In particular, our results 
differ from the ones in Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014) in the sense that they 
find an increase in job turn-over, as we do, but also an increase in total employment. This 
may be due to the fact that they analyse the firm's maximization problem for a sample quite 
different from the one we have.19 They find that these firms react to the reform by 
substituting permanent workers by temporary ones, all this process resulting in a 3.5% 
increase in total employment but a null effect on productivity. They also find an increase in 
turnover what makes easier to exit from unemployment, especially for high-qualified 
workers who may be working more in equilibrium in their sample of large firms in the 
manufacturing sector.20 But, at the same time, this process makes it much easier for low-
skilled workers to be unemployed, which results in a less stable career for this type of 
workers (the ones we analyse in this paper). Thus, in a similar flavor to the results from 
Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014), we do find an increase in employment at 
earlier ages, that we interpret as the reform facilitating the initial labour market insertion of 
young workers. However, we also find that the reform fostered a more unstable labour 
market career for low-skilled workers due to the increase in the number of non-permanent 
employment spells. Therefore, we go a step further from the current literature in providing 
evidence of the negative long-term effects of the introduction of temporary contracts, 
especially for low-skilled workers. 
                                               
19 They analyse the results of introducing temporary contracts with a sample of 2,356 Spanish manufacturing 
firms during the period 1982-1993. Hence, they focus on a group of firms larger than the average for the 
Spanish economy and where the typical worker is a medium-high qualified one with a permanent contract, 
both before and after the 1984 reform. As Table 1 shows, we have just 17.4% of workers in our sample 
working in manufacturing firms. 
20 These results are obtained under a critical assumption about the wage of temporary workers being constant 
across firms. Furthermore, they lack measures of gross employment flows, so that their results are based on 
net employment changes. This may underestimate the importance of firing costs for permanent workers what 
could be behind their results of so much substitution of permanent workers with temporary ones.  
28 
 
    One potential channel through which the labour market career of low-skilled young 
workers becomes more unstable is by changing the nature of the first employment 
experience when entering the labour market. We know from previous literature that the 
first contract has a strong impact on the future career in the labour market. Thus, in order to 
explore in more detail this potential channel, we construct two variables that we use as 
“proxies” of the type of contract when first entering the labour market. As explained above, 
we only have information on temporary/permanent contracts from 1990. However, we do 
know the duration of all contracts in our sample. Thus, we assign a contract to be 
temporary if it lasts for less than two/three years and we use the probability that the first 
contract is permanent (using these two definitions) as our dependent variable. Table 14 in 
the appendix shows that high school dropouts that turn 16 after the liberalization of fixed-
term contracts are less likely to have a permanent contract in the first labour market 
experience than high school dropouts that turn 16 before the reform. Although the effect is 
also negative for high school graduates, the coefficient is half the size, pointing towards 
stronger negative impacts for low skill young workers. In columns five and six of Table 14, 
we can see that the diff-in-diff coefficients comparing high school dropouts and graduates 
that enter the labour market before and after the reform are negative and statistically 
significant. Therefore, even when netting out the effect of potential changes in labour 
market trends at the same time than the introduction of the reform, we can see that the 
liberalization of fixed terms contracts decreases the likelihood of entering the labour 
market with a permanent contract for low skill young workers in Spain. As described 
above, there is plenty of literature showing that this first labour market contract determines, 
to a large extent, your future employment contracts. Thus, we believe that this provides 
evidence that (one) of the channels explaining the large negative long-term employment 
and wage effects estimated in the previous section is the change in the type of contract 




4.2. Robustness Tests 
In our baseline results, we include 4 cohort-years (16 trimesters) before and 4 cohort-years 
after the reform. As a robustness test we reduce the bandwidth to 2 cohort years (8 
trimesters) or 3 cohort years (12 trimesters). In both cases, the impact of the reform on days 
worked (col 1-2, Table 9) and earnings (col. 1-2 Table 10) is significant and quantitatively 
almost the same as in our baseline results. The negative impact of the liberalization of 
fixed-term contracts on employment and earnings is thus robust to the choice of bandwidth. 
Linear trends are used in our baseline results. As a robustness test, we use second and third 
degree polynomials for the cohort trends. The negative impact of the reform on days 
worked and on earnings is robust to the inclusion of these polynomial trends (col. 3-4, 
Table 9 for days worked and col. 3-4, Table 10 for earnings). Overall, our results are thus 
very robust to controlling for higher order polynomials.   
In specification (1), we include all cohorts from the first trimester of 1965 to the fourth 
trimester of 1972. The reform was approved in August of 1984 but the law was not fully 
implemented until October 1984, so those born in the third trimester of 1968 may have 
been partially affected. At the same time, those born in the fourth trimester of 1968 may 
not have been fully affected if it took time for firms to adopt fixed-term contracts. Thus, we 
run the same model including dummies for these two transition cohorts (third and fourth 
trimester of 1968) in the regression. The results of this model are reported in col. 5 Table 9 
for days worked and in col. 5 Table 10 for earnings. The negative impact of the reform on 
days worked and on earnings is thus robust to excluding transition cohorts from the 
estimation of the reform’s impact. 
Our baseline specification controls for years of potential experience, as is customary in 
wage regressions. However, one may be concerned that, to the extent that the post-reform 
cohort is one trimester younger than the pre-reform cohort, failing to control for this 
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difference in potential experience may be biasing the results. Regression in Table 9 col. 6 
and Table 10 col. 6 control for quarterly potential experience dummies. The negative 
impact of the reform on days worked and on earnings is still highly significant, and is thus 
not driven by a failure to control for potential experience at the quarterly level. 
One concern with our baseline estimates is that they could be biased by changes in the 
labour market that occurred in the same trimester as the reform. This concern is already 
made less acute by the fact that the difference-in-differences estimates show the same result 
as our baseline estimate. Furthermore, as we include the pre and post reform trends in our 
empirical model, we are only focusing on differences in long-term labour market outcomes 
between two trimester cohorts that enter the labour market only three months apart (the 
cohort that enters the labour market on the third trimester of 1984 against the cohort that 
enters the labour market on the fourth trimester of 1984). Thus, we can expect the labour 
market conditions to be quite similar in a time span of only three months. Still, here, we 
explore the sensitivity of our results to trends in economic conditions. Indeed, prior to the 
reform, youth unemployment rate in Spain was very high and increasing (Figure 1). So one 
may worry that the worsening economic conditions are biasing the results. To address this 
concern we follow two alternative strategies. First, we split the sample into regions with 
average high (7 percentage points) and low (3.1 percentage points) growth in 
unemployment during the period 1982-1986. While the impact of the reform on days 
worked is negative in both low and high (Table 11) unemployment regions, the impact 
tends to be larger and more significant in low unemployment regions. This suggests that the 
negative impact of the reform on days worked was not driven by regions where 
unemployment was growing particularly rapidly. The second strategy we follow to account 
for the impact of labour market conditions is to include the unemployment rate of the 
trimester of labour market entry for each trimester cohort. Our main specification already 
controls for year fixed effects to account for macroeconomic conditions after entering the 
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labour market. Thus, including the control for trimester unemployment rate accounts for 
differences in initial trimester economic conditions given the macroeconomic conditions in 
the current year (which are controlled for by the year fixed effects). We can see in Table 12 
that the results including this additional variable remain negative and significant and the 
point estimates are somewhat larger (more negative) than our baseline results reported in 
Tables 6 and 7. Additionally, the unemployment rate coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero, consistent with the idea that labour conditions in the trimester before 
and after the introduction of the reform are not sufficiently different to turn the coefficient 
significant.  
It has to be noted that this result is not comparable to the results found in the literature 
that study the long term effects of bad economic conditions at labour market entry. We are 
using a trimester cohort regression discontinuity approach in order to isolate the impact of 
the 1984 reform by comparing only two trimester cohorts and controlling for differences in 
pre and post reform cohorts with the trends. On the other hand, the literature on long-term 
effects of economic conditions exploits the differences in unemployment rates at the time 
of labour market entry across all cohorts and regions. In fact, Garcia Perez and Vall 
Castelló (2015) use the same administrative data for Spain but follow the strategy in 
Oreopoulus et al. (2012) and report significant negative long-term employment and wage 
effects for high-school dropouts entering the labour market in bad economic conditions in 
Spain. 
We also perform placebo tests in which we simulate the policy to take place in a number 
of pre and post reform years (from 1966 to 1971). We use the specification from equation 
(1). The negative impact of the reform on days worked (appendix Figure 12) and earnings 
(appendix Figure 13) is largest for the true date. At the same time, the impact of the 
placebo reform is almost as negative though generally insignificant for dates after the 
reform. This can be explained by the fact that there is both a jump and a change in the 
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cohort trend at the time of the reform, and linear trends are too coarse to capture such 
complex changes. To allow for a more local estimate of the cohort trend, we have 
performed these placebo tests with a narrower bandwidth of 2 cohort years instead of 4 
cohort years. In this case, the impact of the reform on days worked is only negative and 
significant for the true date of the reform (Figure 9), and the placebo estimates for dates 
prior to or after the reform are close to zero. A similar picture emerges when the logarithm 
of yearly earnings is the outcome (Figure 10). These placebo tests reinforce our conclusion 
that the liberalization of fixed-term contracts use had a negative effect on the long-run 
employment and earnings outcomes for male high school dropouts. 
Finally, we estimate the same baseline specifications than in Tables 6 and 7 for days 
worked and earnings but collapsing only by trimester-cohort holding fixed the time horizon 
over which the data are collapsed for each cohort (we use both 10 and 20 years as a 
horizon). For days worked, if we compare table 6 (baseline specification) versus table 15 
we can see that the effects are very similar, slightly larger in magnitude and still highly 
statistically significant. The same can be said for earnings comparing table 7 against table 
16. Thus, even if the specification collapsing only by cohort is slightly less clean than our 
baseline specification collapsing by cohort and year, it is reassuring that the results are 
remarkably consistent. 
 
       5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have investigated the impact of entering the labour market under a lax 
regulation of fixed-term contracts on subsequent labour market outcomes. Using Spanish 
social security data, we found that the trimester-of-birth cohort of native male high school 
dropouts who entered the labour market under a lax regulation of fixed-term contracts 
experienced worse labour market outcomes than the cohort that just preceded them. 
Specifically, entering the labour market under a lax regulation of fixed-term contracts leads 
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to 4.9% fewer days worked and a 9.8% reduction in earnings in the first ten years in the 
labour market. This is the case despite the fact that the reform likely increased the 
probability of working before age 19. The source of those negative effects on long-term 
outcomes is likely to be the larger probability of working under non-permanent contracts 
well after labour market entry, which also makes it more likely to be subject to the well-
known wage penalties due to unemployment and temporary work (see, for example, 
Jimeno and Toharia (1993), García Pérez and Rebollo (2005) or Fernández-Kranz et al. 
(2015)). 
   Hence, our findings suggest that, on balance, making fixed-term contracts more readily 
available reduced the welfare of low skilled workers. Even though these contracts seem to 
allow low skilled workers to secure a first job more rapidly, the long-run consequences are 
negative. Fixed-term contracts ultimately reduce the long-run employment and earnings 
prospects of low skilled workers. Far from being a stepping stone, fixed-term contracts are 















Figure 1.   Unemployment Rate in Spain for Workers with Less Than 25 Years Old; Share 
of Temporary Contracts for Men Aged 15-24 in Spain and Average Share of Temporary 
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Figure 2.   Total Number of New Temporary Contracts and Total Number of Employees in 
Non-Agricultural Private Sectors. 
 












































































































Figure 3.  Number of Apprenticeship Contracts and Percentage of Apprenticeship 
Contracts with Respect to Employees in Non-Agricultural Private Sectors Aged between 16 
and 19 Years Old. 
 
 





































































































Percentage of Apprenticeship Contracts 
w.r.t employees aged 16-19










  Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Unempl. Rate Region at LM Entry 24.926 19.05 68.544 18.70 
REGION AT LM ENTRY     
  Andalucia 6.410 25.72 13.472 19.65 
Aragon 417 1.67 1.894 2.76 
Asturias 474 1.90 1.555 2.27 
Baleares 534 2.14 1.828 2.67 
Canarias 1.706 6.84 3.211 4.68 
Cantabria 298 1.20 879 1.28 
Cast. Leon 1.401 5.62 3.184 4.65 
Cast. Mancha 1.272 5.10 3.964 5.78 
Catalunya 3.302 13.25 10.476 15.28 
Valencia 2.839 11.39 7.207 10.51 
Extremadura 1.022 4.10 2.093 3.05 
Galicia 1.635 6.56 4.088 5.96 
Madrid 1.912 7.67 7.692 11.22 
Murcia 799 3.21 2.199 3.21 
Navarra 172 0.69 952 1.39 
Pais Vasco 624 2.50 3.400 4.96 
Rioja 109 0.44 450 0.66 
SECTOR OF FIRST JOB     
  High Tech. Manufacturing 1.585 6.36 5.744 8.41 
Low Tech. Manufacturing 2.889 11.59 8.444 12.37 
High Tech. Services 565 2.27 2.703 3.96 
Finance 48 0.19 201 0.29 
Health and Education 237 0.95 804 1.18 
Trade 3.572 14.33 12.850 18.82 
Hotels and Catering services 2.318 9.30 7.103 10.40 
Other low tech. Activities 996 4.00 3.412 5.00 
Agriculture 4.756 19.08 7.347 10.76 
Mining and Energy 122 0.49 342 0.50 
Construction 4.556 18.28 10.016 14.67 
Public Administration 1.032 4.14 2.596 3.80 
Real State 96 0.39 361 0.53 
Temporary Help Agencies 61 0.24 287 0.42 
Missing 2.093 8.40 6.061 8.81 
Source: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL).  
Notes. For the region at labour market entry and the sector of first job, the mean corresponds to the 
percentage in each category. 
                                               













  Obs % Obs % 
COHORT     
  1962 2.262 9.07 4.552 6.67 
1963 2.283 9.16 4.640 6.80 
1964 2.286 9.17 4.958 7.26 
1965 2.010 8.06 4.710 6.90 
1966 2.103 8.44 4.806 7.04 
1967 1.987 7.97 4.760 6.97 
1968 1.795 7.20 4.843 7.09 
1969 1.652 6.63 4.814 7.05 
1970 1.618 6.49 4.834 7.08 
1971 1.494 5.99 5.171 7.57 
1972 1.439 5.77 5.007 7.33 
1973 1.401 5.62 4.956 7.26 
1974 1.271 5.10 5.046 7.39 
1975 1.325 5.32 5.174 7.58 
 











Figure 4.   Total Number of Men in Our Sample for Each Birth Cohort and Share of Males 
Who Are High-School Dropouts for Each Cohort. 
 






























































































Number HS Dropout Males in our sample




Probability of Being a High School Dropout. 
  Linear Trend Quadratic Trend 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
After -0.011 -0.012 0.013 0.015 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Trend -0.003*** -0.001 -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
After*Trend 0.000 -0.001 0.007*** 0.007** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
UR entry (region) 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trimester Birth 2 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Trimester Birth 3 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Trimester Birth 4 0.011** 0.011** 0.009 0.008 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Trend^2   -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
(After*Trend)^2   0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.164*** 0.376*** 0.143*** 0.362*** 
 
(0.011) (0.066) (0.011) (0.065) 
Year f.e.  X 
 
X 
Observations 52,984 52,984 52,984 52,984 
R-squared 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.012 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
   
Source: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) Sample of  Native Males who are High School 
dropouts (born between 1965 and 1972 and start working before age 20) or High School graduates  (born 





Number of Temporary and Non-Permanent Contracts Per Year. 
  Since 1990 up to 2012 
 
High school dropouts   High school graduates   DiD 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) 
Panel A: Temporary 
contracts       
        


































      
0.042** 
       
(0.018) 
Treat 
      
0.099*** 



















R-squared 0.055 0.900   0.059 0.945   0.905 
Panel B: Non-permanent 
contracts       
        


































      
0.052** 
       
(0.023) 
Treat 
      
0.108*** 



















R-squared 0.060 0.880   0.057 0.903   0.877 
Robust standard errors clustered by cohort in parentheses 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
 
Source: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) Sample of  Native Males who are High School 
dropouts (born between 1965 and 1972 and start working before age 20) or High School graduates  (born 
between 1962 and 1969 and start working before age 22). 








Notes. The coefficients are from a regression of the probability of having the first job at age 18 or before with 
dummies for cohorts, dummies for the trimester of birth and the unemployment rate of the region at the 
trimester of labour market entry. 
 




































































































Notes. The coefficients are from a regression of the probability of having the first job at age 19 or before with 
dummies for cohorts, dummies for the trimester of birth and the unemployment rate of the region at the 

































































































Probability of Working before Age 18/19, Individual-Level Data. 
  Before 18 Before 19 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
After 0.024 0.032* 0.064*** 0.088*** 
 
(0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) 
Trend -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
After*Trend 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
UR entry (region) -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.005 -0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Trimester Birth 1 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.126*** 0.121*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Trimester Birth 2 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.099*** 0.095*** 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Trimester Birth 3 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.040*** 0.029** 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 














Constant 0.349*** 0.345*** 0.437*** 0.425*** 
 
(0.060) (0.060) (0.066) (0.067) 
 
  
  Observations 14,069 14,069 14,069 14,069 
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
   
Source: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) Sample of  Native Males who are High School 
dropouts (born between 1965 and 1972 and start working before age 20) or High School graduates  (born 








Figure 6.   Annual Number of Days Worked in the First Ten Years of Potential Labour 


































Figure 8.   Logarithm of Yearly Earnings in the First 10 Years of Labour Market 
Experience: High-School Dropouts. 
 




























Number of Days Worked Per Year. 
  First 10 years of potential experience   Up to 2012 
 




















































      
-17.211*** 
  
       
(2.267) 
  Treat 
      
-25.571*** 
  
       
(1.888) 

























R-squared 0.050 0.845   0.004 0.892   0.812 
 
0.935 
Robust standard errors clustered by cohort in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                 
 
Source: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) Sample of  Native Males who are High School 
dropouts (born between 1965 and 1972 and start working before age 20) or High School graduates  (born 







Logarithm of Yearly Earnings. 
  First 10 years of potential experience   Up to 2012 
 



















































      
-0.120** 
  
       
(0.022) 
  Treat 
      
-0.348*** 
  
       
(0.020) 

























R-squared 0.029 0.902   0.017 0.909  0.878 
 
0.970 
Robust standard errors clustered by cohort in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                 
 
Source: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) Sample of  Native Males who are High School 
dropouts (born between 1965 and 1972 and start working before age 20) or High School graduates  (born 




















Interactions of the Effect of the Reform with Potential Experience Dummies. High-School 
Dropouts. 
 
  Days Worked Log.Earnings Days Worked Log Earnings 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
Trend 0.110 -0.002 0.025 -0.002 
 
(0.615) (0.004) (0.599) (0.004) 
After*Trend -0.911** -0.009*** -0.749** -0.007*** 
 
(0.263) (0.002) (0.257) (0.002) 
After*PotExp0_9 -10.591*** -0.097***   
 
(3.586) (0.032)   
After*PotExp0_3   -36.434*** -0.317*** 
 
  (7.424) (0.067) 
After*PotExp4_9   -3.946 -0.045* 
 
  (4.073) (0.034) 
After*PotExp10_19 -4.507* -0.058** -3.621 -0.050** 
 
(2.598) (0.023) (2.657) (0.022) 
After*PotExp20+ -6.380* -0.067** -5.964** -0.063*** 
 
(2.958) (0.023) (2.933) (0.022) 
Constant 247.169*** 8.446*** 239.423*** 8.307*** 
 
(80.729) (0.500) (82.835) (0.490) 
Year f.e. X X X X 
Potential exp f.e. X X X X 
Observations 912 912 912 912 
R-squared 0.935  0.971 0.938 0.973 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
Source: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) Sample of  Native Males who are High School 
dropouts (born between 1965 and 1972 and start working before age 20) or High School graduates  (born 






Robustness Checks. Number of Days Worked Per Year, High-School Dropouts. 
 
  First 10 years of potential experience     
 













Degree     














































   
-0.009 -0.448 
    
    
(0.076) (0.487) 
    After*Trend^2 
   
-0.014 -0.052 
    
    
(0.101) (0.570) 
    Trend^3 
    
-0.018 
    
     
(0.019) 
    After*Trend^3 
    
0.038 
    
     
(0.023) 




























Robust standard errors clustered by cohort in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                 
 
Source: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) Sample of  Native Males who are High School 
dropouts (born between 1965 and 1972 and start working before age 20) or High School graduates  (born 





Robustness Checks. Logarithm of Yearly Earnings, High-School Dropouts. 
 
  First 10 years of potential experience     
 









8 Trimest 12 Trimest   2nd Degree 
3rd 
Degree     














































   
-0.000 -0.005 
    
    
(0.000) (0.004) 
    After*Trend^2 
   
0.000 0.001 
    
    
(0.000) (0.005) 
    Trend^3 
    
-0.000 
    
     
(0.000) 
    After*Trend^3 
    
0.000 
    
     
(0.000) 




























Robust standard errors clustered by cohort in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                 
 
Source: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) Sample of  Native Males who are High School 
dropouts (born between 1965 and 1972 and start working before age 20) or High School graduates  (born 

















Number of Days Worked Per Year in Regions with Low and High Unemployment Rate 
Growth in the 1980s. 
  First 10 years of potential experience  
 Low UR growth High UR growth 
 
HS dropouts HS graduates DiD HS dropouts HS graduates DiD 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
After -18.033*** 1.525 1.475 -6.140 1.764 4.425 
 
(5.251) (4.322) (3.237) (5.312) (3.131) (2.882) 
Trend 1.095 -4.267*** -3.013*** -1.261 -2.373*** -1.924*** 
 
(0.973) (0.686) (0.548) (1.259) (0.487) (0.412) 
After*Trend -2.676*** -0.293 -0.777** -1.709** -0.006 -0.325 
 
(0.626) (0.410) (0.319) (0.647) (0.311) (0.301) 
After*Treat   -16.998***   -17.556*** 
 
  (3.470)   (3.218) 
Treat   -31.177***   -22.275*** 
 
  (2.647)   (2.777) 
Year f.e. X X X X X X 
Potential exp f.e. X X X X X X 
Observations 352 416 768 352 416 768 
R-squared 0.808 0.884 0.790 0.814 0.883 0.802 
Robust standard errors clustered by cohort in parentheses 
 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes. Regions with low average unemployment rate growth (3.1 percentage points) in 1982-1986 were: 
Baleares, Catalunya, Valencia, Murcia & Castilla La Mancha. 
Source: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) Sample of  Native Males who are High School 
dropouts (born between 1965 and 1972 and start working before age 20) or High School graduates  (born 






Number of Days Worked Per Year and Logarithm of Yearly Wages for High School 
Dropouts after Controlling for the Unemployment Rate of the Trimester of Labour Market 
Entry. 
  First 10 years of potential experience 
 
Number of days worked   Logarithm yearly wages 
   (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 







































 Observations 352 352 
 
352 352 
 R-squared 0.051 0.849   0.033 0.907 
 Robust standard errors clustered by cohort in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
 
Source: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) Sample of  Native Males who are High School 






Figure 9. Number of Days Worked Per Year: Placebo Test, 2 Cohort-Years Bandwidth. 
      
        Source: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) Sample of  Native Males who are High School 
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Figure 10. Logarithm of Yearly Earnings: Placebo Test, 2 Cohort-Years Bandwidth. 
       
 
        Source: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) Sample of  Native Males who are High School 
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Appendix A. Additional Tables  
 
Table A1 
Aggregation of Sectors in the Economy. 
 
Sector of the economy Description of sector 
High Tech. 
Manufacturing 
Manufacturing using capital intensive and ICT 




Manufacturing with low capital intensity (Furniture, 
Plastics, etc.) 
High Tech. Services Transport, Telecommunication, Finances, Education, 
Health, etc. 
Trade Wholesale trade, retail. 
 Hotels, restaurants, etc. 
Other Low Tech. 
Activities 
Labour intensive Services (water and waste 
treatment, personal services), Agriculture, Energy 
Industry 
Construction Building activities 
Public Administration 
& Real State 
All public activities but health and education. Real 
State activities  
Missing No information about sector of activity 
 





Probability that the First Contract in the Labour Market is a Permanent One (as Proxied 
by Having a Duration of More than Two/Three Years). 
 















































      
-0.048** -0.050*** 
       
(0.017) (0.012) 
Treat 
      
0.082*** 0.002 
       
(0.013) (0.010) 















Robust standard errors clustered by cohort in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1              
 
Source: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) Sample of  Native Males who are High School 
dropouts (born between 1965 and 1972 and start working before age 20) or High School graduates  (born 























Number of Days Worked Per Year. Regressions Collapsing Only by Cohort (in Trimesters). 
 
First 10 years of potential experience 






graduates DiD High school dropouts 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
After -14.480*** -0.719 -1.352 -8.723*** 
 
(3.720) (2.651) (2.125) (2.366) 
Trend 0.933*** 0.617* 0.850 0.909*** 
 
(0.312) (0.357) (0.222) (0.225) 
After*Trend -2.214*** -1.283** -1.561*** -1.519*** 
 











   
(1.730) 
 Constant 218.226*** 228.848*** 230.005*** 246.588*** 
 
(3.066) (2.389) (1.790) (1.703) 
     Observations 32 32 64 32 
R-squared 0.806 0.810 0.912 0.589 
Robust standard errors clustered by cohort in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) Sample of  Native Males who are High School 
dropouts (born between 1965 and 1972 and start working before age 20) or High School graduates  (born 



























Logarithm of Yearly Earnings. Regressions Collapsing only by Cohort (in Trimesters). 
 
First 10 years of potential experience 






graduates DiD High school dropouts 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
After -0.133*** -0.017 -0.035** -0.083*** 
 
(0.033) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) 
Trend 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
After*Trend -0.022*** -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.012*** 
 











   
(0.015) 
 Constant 8.861*** 0.002*** 9.025*** 9.175*** 
 
(0.028) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) 
     Observations 32 32 64 32 
R-squared 0.732 0.550 0.943 0.698 
Robust standard errors clustered by cohort in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) Sample of  Native Males who are High School 
dropouts (born between 1965 and 1972 and start working before age 20) or High School graduates  (born 


























Appendix B. Additional Figures 
 
Figure B1.   Share of Individuals Who Find the First Job at Age 16 by Cohort and Share of 
Individuals Who Find the First Job at Age 15 or Before by Cohort. 
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Figure B2.   Number of Days Worked Per Year: Placebo Test. 
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Figure B3. Log Yearly Earnings: Placebo Test. 
     
      Source: Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL). 
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